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ESSAYS
LEGAL DIFFERENCES WITHOUT ECONOMIC
DISTINCTIONS: POINTS, PENALTIES, AND THE
MARKET FOR MORTGAGES
ALAN

L.

FELD AND STEPHEN

G.

MARKS*

INTRODUCTION

Economic analysis can serve many functions when applied to the law,
most notably prediction (how people' react to laws and lawmaking
processes), evaluation (whether these reactions result in social efficiency),
and description (which features of laws, and lawmaking are salient). Here
we propose to describe. We use economic analysis to show a legal difference without an economic distinction. We demonstrate the economic
equivalence of two practices in the mortgage market. Interestingly, widespread bans exist on one of these practices, but no restrictions exist on
the other.
Specifically, in this essay we examine the relationship among points,
prepayment penalties, and financial regulation. We show that a mortgage
loan with points contains an implicit, and easily calculable, prepayment
penalty. Paradoxically, however, while many states and federal agencies
ban explicit prepayment penalties, all accept points. Furthermore, lenders must disclose explicit prepayment penalties to borrowers. Yet, while
regulations routinely require disclosure of other implicit information,
such as the true interest rate (APR) of loans with points,' no regulation
requires disclosure of the implicit prepayment penalties created through
points.
Although we use economic analysis- here primarily to describe, even
mere description can, and does, lead to policy recommendations. in this
case, descriptive economic analysis, coupled with existing norms for disclosure, suggests the desirability of additional disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, by revealing contradictions in the treatment of points and
penalties, this descriptive economic analysis indicates a need to rethink
*

Professors of Law, Boston University School of Law. We thank Professor Jack

Beermann for his time, his careful comments, and his encouragement. We thank
Doug Cornelius and Zachary Beim for able research assistance and Peter Fernandez,
Carmela Correale, and Chris Wagner for their efficient administrative assistance.
1 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605-06 (1994).
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the current bans on mortgage penalties and the current treatment of
points.
I.

BACKGROUND

When an individual borrows to purchase a home, or secures a loan with
a mortgage on the home, the lender and the borrower agree on a repayment schedule extending over a stated number of years. For two general
reasons, the homeowner may later wish to prepay the loan. First, if interest rates decline, the homeowner who has borrowed at a fixed rate may
seek to borrow at the lower rate and prepay the existing mortgage loan.
Secondly, the homeowner may need liquidity and may seek to sell the
home. Typically, this occurs when a homeowner desires to relocate and
needs to convert the equity in the home to cash in order to purchase a
new home in a different location. The homeowner may also require liquidity for other purposes, such as to pay off another loan, to start a new
business, or to purchase another asset. When the homeowner seeks to
sell the property, the mortgage agreement may not permit a new owner
to assume the old mortgage. Alternatively, the purchaser may not want
the outstanding mortgage with its particular interest rate, payment schedule, and duration. These situations condition the home transfer on prepayment of the mortgage.
Both types of prepayment risk present lenders with uncertainty regarding the timing of cash flows. 2 Interest rate motivated prepayments exacerbate interest rate risk, because such prepayments put the lender on the
wrong side of any shift in the interest rates. If market rates rise above the
mortgage rate, the borrower does not prepay the loan and the lender continues to receive the below-market rate. If market rates fall below the
mortgage rate, the borrower prepays the loan and the lender must now
re-lend the money at the lower market rate.
Consider a $100,000 thirty-year mortgage loan with a nominal interest
rate of 6% (0.5% per month) and monthly payments of $599.55. Table 1
gives the present value of the loan, with and without the possibility of
prepayment, for various market rates. With the possibility of prepayment, the borrower will prepay if rates fall to 5%, but not if rates rise to
7%. This eliminates the upside for the lender. The lender may still realize the downside.
At common law, courts differed as to whether a borrower could require
a lender to accept prepayment of a loan. A majority of states did not give
the borrower a right to prepay a mortgage loan, on the ground that pre2

Often, the lender passes the risk of prepayment on to holders of mortgage-

backed securities. The lender does suffer a cost from this risk, however, since the
lender must compensate the holders of the mortgage-backed securities for taking the
prepayment risk. In other words, loans with prepayment risk are worth less than
identical loans without prepayment risk.
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TABLE 1

Market Rate
7%
6%
5%

Asset Value without
Prepayment Possibility (PV)
90,116.98
100,000.00
111,685.24

Asset Value with
Prepayment Possibility (PV)
90,116.98
100,000.00
100,000.00

payment varied the provisions of the loan contract.3 Many states have
reversed this rule and have enacted statutes to permit prepayment.4 In
several states, however, the borrower has no general right to prepay and
must ground any prepayment in the loan contract. 5
To limit prepayment risk, a lender may seek to include a prepayment
penalty in the mortgage. A prepayment penalty requires a homeowner
who pays off a mortgage earlier than the maturity date to pay a monetary

penalty in addition to the principal remaining on the loan. Currently,
several states prohibit prepayment penalties in home mortgages, while

others regulate prepayment penalties in various ways.6 Perhaps more sig3

See, .e.g., Smiddy v. Grafton, 124 P. 433, 435 (Cal. 1912) (stating that where a

mortgage is not due, the mortgagee cannot be compelled to accept payment and re-

lease the mortgage); Pyross v. Fraser, 64 S.E. 407, 407 (S.C. 1909) (holding that receipt of part of the debt before maturity was not a waiver of the creditor's right to
hold the remainder of his investment until maturity); Peryer v. Pennock, 115 A. 105,
105 (Vt. 1921) (holding that payments cannot be made before the due date without
consent of the person to whom the payments are due).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 969(a) (1993) ("An individual borrower may

prepay a loan in full at any time.");

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 697.06 (West 1994) ("Any note

which is silent as to the right of the obligor to prepay the note in advance of the stated
maturity date may be prepaid in full by the obligor or his successor in interest without
penalty."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-207(c) (995) (prohibiting penalty when prepayment is made more than six months after execution of note).'
5 See, e.g., Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 597
A.2d 1377, 1387 (Md. 1991) (holding that, absent a provision for prepayment in the
loan contract, a borrower does not have a right to prepay); Boyd v. Life Ins. Co. of
the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (allowing a prepayment
penalty where the note was silent as to prepayment).
6 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.036 (West 1997) (limiting prepayment penalties
to two percent of the loan balance at the time of prepayment and prohibiting any
penalty after five years from loan origination date); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-2 (West
1989) (allowing prepayment at any time without penalty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-30
(Michie Supp. 1996) (stating that no prepayment penalty is enforceable); 41 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 405 (West 1992) (prohibiting prepayment penalties); VA.

CODE

§ 6.1-330.83 (Michie 1993) (stating that a prepayment penalty cannot exceed
two percent of the amount of such prepayment). For a good discussion on the ability
to prepay mortgage loans and prepayment penalties, including case law and statutory
references, see generally Robert K. Baldwin, Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey
and Suggestion, 40 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1987).
ANN.
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nificantly, both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have long-standing bans on
prepayment penalties. 7 The Federal Housing Administration likewise
bans prepayment penalties in loans it insures.'
While many states ban or regulate prepayment penalties, no state or
federal agency bans points. A mortgage with points requires payment of
an upfront fee, typically in return for a lower nominal interest rate. Federal law requires that lenders state the true interest rate, known as the
APR. For example, a 7.5% thirty-year loan of $100,000 with monthly
payments and 4 points has an APR of 7.92%. The lender calculates the
APR assuming monthly payments of $699.21 on a loan of $96,000
($100,000 less the 4 points).
In this essay, we make no arguments about the wisdom of bans on prepayment penalties.' Rather, we demonstrate that points entail an implicit
prepayment penalty. Thus, if some states or agencies ban prepayment
penalties as an important policy goal, then we assert that the effect of
points on a borrower's prepayment options circumvents this goal. In addition, even in states that do not ban prepayment penalties, it is in the
interest of consumer protection for legislation to require lenders to dis7

See

GRANT

S. NELSON &

DALE

A.

WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW

§ 6.4,

at 426 & n.18 (3d ed. 1994) (citing FNMA Conventional Home Mortgage Selling Contract Supplement § 301.05 and FHLMC Servicers' Guide § 4.113).
s See 24 C.F.R. § 203.22(b) (1996) (permitting prepayment in whole or in part on
any installment without penalty).
9 The bans imposed by states were probably motivated by pro-consumer sentiment
that regarded as unfair the, imposition of a penalty on a homeowner who sold his
home. Lenders typically have been regarded as having greater sophistication and bargaining power than home mortgage borrowers. Moreover, restraints on prepayment
may indirectly restrain alienation of property, especially since lenders typically do not
have to permit other would-be borrowers to assume the loan. The possibility that
prepayment could also arise when a homeowner seeks to take advantage of lower
interest rates by refinancing either was not considered or was not weighed as heavily.
In a sophisticated and liquid financial market that allows institutional lenders to
hedge against interest rate declines at relatively low costs, a ban on prepayment penalties may operate to shift the risks of declining interest rates and the costs of hedging
to the party better able to internalize them. If the ban on prepayment penalties systematically burdened lenders, we would anticipate that mortgage interest rates would
rise somewhat to compensate them.
The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bans on prepayment penalties, dating from 1979,
may stem from similar considerations. In June 1994, Fannie Mae extended the prohibition on prepayment penalties to penalties incorporated by rider even if not present
in the principal documents. In the wake of recent refinancings by homeowners to
benefit from declining interest rates, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may have to reconsider their policies. To the extent that points substitute for prepayment penalties
without overtly altering the financial product as it appears in the secondary market,
points may provide an efficient substitute for explicit penalties in reducing the incidence of prepayment.
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close prepayment penalties, whether explicit or implicit. 10 Currently, no
state nor the federal government has passed such disclosure legislation.
II.

THE ARGUMENT

We sketch our argument using an example. We begin with a mortgage
with no points and no explicit prepayment penalty. We then add an explicit prepayment penalty schedule. Finally, we replicate the prepayment
penalty schedule using points.
A.

Loan A-The Conventional Loan: No Prepayment Penalty, No
Points

For ease of exposition, we begin with a five-year loan of $97,000 with
annual payments and an annual interest rate of 10%.11 For the moment
we assume a zero tax rate and also lay aside other costs associated with
refinancing, such as those of title searches and appraisals, which might
affect the refinancing decision. As Table 2 indicates, a 10% rate implies
five annual payments of $25,588.36.
TABLE 2
Loan A: $97,000, 10% per' year, 5 years, no points
Annual
Interest
Principal
Year

Principal

Payment

Component

Component

1

25588.36

9700.00

15888.36

81111.64

2
3

25588.36
25588.36

8111.16
6363.44

17477.20
19224.92

63634.44
44409.52

4

25588.36

4440.95

21147.41

5

23262.11

25588.36

2326.21

23262.11

0.00

0

Remaining

97000.00

We interpret Table 2 as follows. The annual payment column represents the amount due on each payment date occurring at the end of each
year. Since we have fully and uniformly amortized the loan, the borrower
pays the same amount at the end of each year. The next two columns
allocate this payment into its respective interest and principal components. We calculate interest by taking ten percent of the amount of the
principal remaining after the previous payment, one year earlier. We
subtract the interest component from the annual payment to get the prin10

The beneficial effects of disclosure on consumer choice, however, may be small-

er than predicted or hoped. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology:
Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 235-36 (1991)

(presenting various empirical studies that suggest a weak correlation between disclosure and consumer choice).
11 We consider a more traditional 30-year mortgage with monthly payments below.
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cipal component. Finally, we reduce the principal remaining by the
amount of the principal component paid each year.
In lieu of paying the annual payment, the borrower can pay off the loan
completely by paying the annual payment plus the principal remaining.
The borrower suffers no penalty for prepaying.
B.

Loan B-Loan with a Prepayment Penalty

Lenders prefer to discourage prepayment because prepayment often
occurs when interest rates fall. A lender can then re-invest the repaid
funds only at a lower rate of return. Where the law permits, lenders can
discourage prepayment by including in the loan agreement a prepayment
penalty schedule. Suppose that the lender designs the prepayment penalty schedule given in Table 3:
TABLE 3
Prepayment After:
One Year
TWo Years

Penalty:
$2118.60
1347.18

Three Years

714.21

Four Years
Five Years

252.54
0.00

The lender penalizes earlier prepayment to a greater extent than later
prepayment. 12 The penalty benefits the lender because it makes prepayment less likely even in the face of lower interest rates. If the borrower
nevertheless prepays, as when interest rates fall enough to make prepayment profitable to the borrower even with payment of the penalty, the
lender receives partial compensation as compared with the no-penalty
loan. Finally, regardless of the interest rate, the lender collects the penalty if the borrower must prepay for liquidity reasons.
Just as the prepayment penalty benefits the lender, the prepayment
penalty harms the borrower, who cannot benefit as easily from lower interest rates. If interest rates have not fallen sufficiently to overcome the
penalty, the borrower may not refinance even though interest rates may
have declined enough to warrant prepayment absent the penalty. In other cases, the borrower may refinance and pay the penalty. And, again, a
borrower must pay the penalty when prepaying for liquidity reasons. In
all of these cases, the borrower suffers relative to a borrower with an
equivalent loan without a prepayment penalty. Table 4 shows the loan
with the prepayment penalty in place.
With Loan B, the borrower may prepay in any given year by paying the
sum of the annual payment and the corresponding prepayment amount.
12 Prepayment penalties typically decline over the life of the loan. We have chosen
these specific numbers for subsequent comparison.
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TABLE 4
Loan B: $97,000, 10% per year, 5 years, no points, prepayment penalty
Year

Annual
Payment

Interest
Component

Principal
Component

Principal
Remaining

Penalty
Amount

Prepayment
Amount

0
1
2
3
4
5

25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36

9700.00
8111.16
6363.44
4440.95
2326.21

15888.36
17477.20
19224.92
21147.41
23262.11

97000.00
81111.64
63634.44
44409.52
23262.11
0.00

2118.60
1347.18
714.21
252.54
0.00

83230.24
64981.62
45123.73
23514.65
0.00

The prepayment amount is the sum of the remaining principal and the
penalty.
C. The Effect of the Penalty
We can illustrate the effect of this penalty by assuming that interest
rates have dropped to 9% after one year. With Loan A, the borrower
could take out a new four-year loan in the amount of $81,111.64 at 9% to
pay off the remaining principal. The borrower would pay $25,036.62 annually for the next four years. Thus, the borrower's payments drop by
more than $500 in years two through five. The borrower in Loan B cannot duplicate these savings. This borrower would have to take a new loan
of $83,230.24 which, at 9%, would produce an annual payment of
$25,690.56. Because this payment exceeds the annual payment under the
original loan, the borrower will choose not to refinance. The prepayment
penalty thereby prevents the borrower from obtaining an advantage from
the decline in the interest rate.
D. Loan C-Loan with Points
Now suppose that the law prohibits the lender from issuing a loan with
a prepayment penalty. Instead of the $97,000 loan as in Loan A, the
lender makes a $100,000 loan with 3 points. Since the 3 points must be
paid up front, the net amount of cash the lender actually transfers to the
borrower is $97,000. In order for the annual payment to be the same as in
Loan B, the lender establishes an interest rate of 8.8186%. Table 5
presents this loan.
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5

Loan C: $100,000, 8.8186% per year, 5 years, 3 points
Year

Annual
Payment

Interest
& Points

Principal
Component

Principal
Remaining

0
1
2
3
4
5

25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36

3000.00
8818.60
7339.74
5730.47
3979.28
2073.66

16769.76
18248.62
19857.89
21609.08
23514.65

100000.00
83230.24
64981.62
45123.73
23514.65
0.00

Loan C and Loan B appear much the same. With each loan, the borrower nets $97,000 initially and pays $25,588.36 annually for five years. A
borrower wishing to prepay must pay the same amount under the two
loans. For example, to prepay after the first year, the borrower must pay
the annual payment of $25,588.36, plus $83,230.24 under either loan.

III.

THE IMPLICIT PREPAYMENT PENALTY

If held to maturity, Loans A, B, and C are identical. The borrower
receives the same amount initially and makes the same annual payments."3 If the borrower prepays the loans, however, the consequences
differ. Loan A has no prepayment penalty. Loan B has an explicit prepayment penalty. Loan C has an implicit prepayment penalty. Therefore, it costs more to prepay Loans B and C than to prepay Loan A.
The implicit prepayment penalty of Loan C derives from the fact that
the points operate as a prepayment of interest to be spread over the life
of the loan. The lender does not refund this interest in the event of a
4
prepayment of principal, thereby creating an effective penalty.'
We can see this effect from another perspective. A borrower who contemplates refinancing makes a comparison between the then-prevailing
market interest rate and the nominal rate stated in the existing loan. The
nominal rate of Loan C is below that of Loan A, to compensate the borrower for the prepayment of interest. Thus, rates must fall further for the
Loan C borrower to find refinancing advantageous than for the Loan A
borrower.
We take no position on whether, as a matter of policy, regulators
should discourage prepayment penalties. We believe, however, that the
consumer should be aware of any explicit or implicit prepayment penalty.
Consumers often may have choices between loans with or without points
13

They do have different tax effects, as discussed below. For now we continue

with the assumption of no taxes.
14 More generally, a prepayment penalty arises under any contract for services to
be rendered ratably, if the purchaser makes a nonrefundable prepayment. As an ex-

ample, consider a sports team that pays an athlete a large signing bonus and then
must decide mid-contract whether to retain the athlete or terminate the contract.
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and should understand the consequences. As consumers and lenders
come to understand the effect of points on future prepayment, lenders
may compete on this basis as well as on the interest rate. Thus, for loans
with points, we should require lenders at least to inform consumers that a
prepayment penalty exists and, ideally, to disclose the amount of this penalty. Lenders can easily calculate the prepayment penalty implicit in
points. This involves four steps:
1. Calculate the initial amount received-the principal less points. 5
2. Calculate the true interest rate, the APR, taking into account
both nominal interest and points. Federal consumer protection
statutes already mandate -the calculation and disclosure of this
6
rate.'
3. Using the APR,.the initial amount received, and the payments,
construct a no-point, no-penalty loan that has these same characteristics. Call this the reference loan.
4. For each period, calculate the difference between the amount required for repayment of the loan in question and that of the reference loan. This is the implicit prepayment penalty.
Consider Loan C as an example. Loan C yields the borrower $97,000
with five annual payments of $25,588.36 and an APR of 10%. The reference loan-Loan A-consists of a no-penalty, no-point loan of $97,000 at
10% with 5 annual payments. The difference in the remaining principal
in each period represents the implicit prepayment penalty:
TABLE

6

Loan C: Implicit Prepayment Penalty
Year

Principal
Remaining Loan C

Principal
Remaining Loan A

0

100000.00

97000.00

3000.00

1
2
3

83230.24
64981.62
45123.73

81111.64
63634.44
44409.52

2118.60
1347.18
714.21

4

23514.65

23262.11

252.54

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

IV.

Implicit
Prepayment Penalty

THE CONVENTIONAL 30-YEAR MORTGAGE

Large and long-lived implicit prepayment penalties can accompany a
conventional self-amortizing home mortgage. Consider a 7.5% thirtyyear loan for $100,000 with monthly payments and 4 points. Such a loan
1r Ideally, we also subtract any fees involved. This would give the consumer the
necessary information. Likewise, the APR should be calculated after subtracting fees
and the reference loan of step three should be a no-penalty, no-points, no-fees loan.
16

See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1605-06 (1994).
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yields the borrower $96,000 and requires monthly payments of $699.21.
The equivalent point-free mortgage also yields the borrower $96,000 and
has monthly payments of $699.21, but bears an interest rate of 7.9222%.
Table 7 shows the remaining balances on these loans and the differences
between them:
TABLE

7

Remaining
Principal on Loan

Remaining Principal
on Equivalent

Implicit

with Points

Point-Free Loan

Pre-Payment Penalty

1
2
3

99078.17
98084.77
97014.25

95185.59
94304.27
93350.53

3892.58
3780.50
3663.72

4
5

95860.62
94617.44

92318.44
91201.54

3542.18
3415.90

10
15
20
25
30

86794.99
75426.67
58905.15
34894.52
0.00

84080.14
73511.28
57826.03
34547.57
0.00

2714.85
1915.39
1079.12
346.95
0.00

End of year

If held to maturity, both loans are equivalent. The borrower receives
the same amount initially and makes the same payments. For every case
of repayment, however, the borrower pays more with the points loan than
with the no-points loan.
We believe that the consumer should be made aware of the implicit
prepayment penalty. For example, suppose that the consumer must decide between a 7.5% loan with four points and a 7.9222% loan with no
points. Current disclosure law would require the bank to provide only
the information in Table 8:
TABLE

8

FIRST LOAN

Nominal amount: $100,000

Nominal rate: 7.5%

Points: 4
Amount received: $96,000
Payments: 360 monthly payments of $699.21
APR: 7.9222%
SECOND LOAN:

Nominal amount: $96,000
Nominal rate: 7.9222%

Points: None

Amount received: $96,000
Payments: 360 monthly payments of $699.21
APR: 7.9222%

415
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This information makes the loans appear identical, when in fact they
differ significantly. We would require the enhanced disclosure of Table 9:
TABLE 9
FIRST LOAN

Nominal amount: $100,000
Nominal rate: 7.5%
Points: 4
Amount received: $96,000
Payments: 360 monthly payments of $699.21
APR: 7.9222%
Prepayment Penalty (Explicit or Implicit):
End of Year
1

Penalty
3892.58

2

3780.50

3

3663.72

4

3542.18

5
10
15

3415.90
2714.85
1915.39

20

1079.12

25

346.95

SECOND LOAN

Nominal amount: $96,000
Nominal rate: 7.9222%
Points: None
Amount received: $96,000
Payments: 360 monthly payments of $699.21
APR: 7.9222%
Prepayment Penalty (Explicit or Implicit): None
From the above information, the consumer would know that, whether
occasioned by a relocation decision or by a desire to take advantage of
lower interest rates, the consumer must pay a penalty to prepay the loan.
Indeed, a borrower would always prefer a mortgage without points unless
a benefit such as a lower APR (not just a lower nominal rate) or tax
advantages offset the prepayment disadvantage.
V.

THE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF POINTS

To explore the tax implications of points, let us return to our original
example of a five-year loan with annual payments. Compare Loan A (no

points) and Loan C (points), assuming a 30% marginal tax rate for all
years and full deductibility of annual interest payments. Note that, for
Loans A and C, the total of interest plus points is the same (in dollars, not
present value) for both loans. For Loan A, the sum of the interest payments is $30,941.76. For Loan C, the sum of the interest payments,
$27,941.75, plus the points, $3,000, equals $30,941.75, the total interest in
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Loan A (except for a rounding error of one penny).17 The pattern of the
interest and points differs, however, and this will have tax implications.
To determine the value of the interest deduction we must take the present value. We will use a discount rate of 10% for both loans, since both
effectively are 10% loans.
The interest component of Loan A has a present value of $24,780.19.
(See Table 10). If we assume a tax rate of 30%, then the tax benefit of
Loan A has a present value of $7,434.06. To calculate the tax benefit of
Loan C, we must know whether we can expense the points or whether we
must deduct them on a straight-line basis.' 8 First let us assume expensing.
At a tax rate of 30%, Loan C yields a total tax benefit with a present
value of $7,618.10. This benefit exceeds the tax benefit of Loan A by
$184.04. If instead we must deduct the points on a straight-line basis,'"
there is a $7,400.45 tax benefit, $33.61 worse than Loan A.

17

Total interest and points = Interest + Points
= (Total payments - Principal) + Points
= Total payments - (Principal - Points)
= Total payments - (Initial amount received)
18 The Internal Revenue Code limits the deductibility of prepaid interest by a cash
basis taxpayer and requires that prepaid interest generally be allocated to the period
in which accrued. See I.R.C. § 461(g)(1) (1994). An exception exists for points that
meet the following requirements: the debt must be incurred to purchase or improve
the borrower's principal residence; the debt must be secured by the principal residence; and the payment of points in that amount must be an established business
practice in the area. See id. § 461(g)(2). Thus, points incurred on a mortgage to finance the purchase of a principal residence generally are currently deductible, while
points incurred on a loan to refinance a prior home loan are not currently deductible.
19 Cf Rev. Proc. 87-15, 1987-1 C.B. 624-25 (authorizing ratable allocation of points
over the life of the debt in many but not all cases for which current deductibility is not
allowed). In the cases that fall outside Rev. Proc. 87-15, an allocation even less
favorable to the taxpayer may result.
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TABLE. 10

Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
Totals:
PV:

Loan A: $97,000, 10% per year, 5 years, no points
Annual
Interest
Principal
Payment
Component
Component
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
25588.36
127941.80

Principal
Remaining
97000.00
81111.64
63634.44
44409.52
23262.11
0.00

9700.00
15888.36
8111.16
17477.20
6363.44
19224.92
4440.95
21147.41
2326.21
23262.11
30941.76
97000.00
24780.19
Loan C: $100,000, 8.8186% per year, 5 years, 3 points (expensed)
Annual
Interest &
Principal
Principal
Year
Payment
Points
Component
Remaining
0
3000.00
100000.00
1
25588.36
8818.60
16769.76
83230.24
2
25588.36
7339.74
18248.62
64981.62
3
25588.36
5730.47
19857.89
45123.73
4
25588.36
3979.28
21609.08
23514.65
5
25588.36
2073.66
23514.65
0.00
Totals:
127941.80
30941.75
100000.00
PV:
25393.68
Loan C: $100,000, 8.8186% per year, 5 years, 3 points (straight-line)
Annual
Interest &
Principal
Principal
Year
Payment
Points
Component
Remaining
0
100000.00
1
25588.36
9418.60
16769.76
83230.24
2
25588.36
7939.74
18248.62
64981.62
3
25588.36
6330.47
19857.89
45123.73
4
25588.36
4579.28
21609.08
23514.65
5
25588.36
2673.66
23514.65
0.00
Totals:
127941.80
30941.75
100000.00
PV:
97000.02
24668.15
The following recaps the present values of the tax benefit in each of the
three cases (Loan A, Loan C expensed, and Loan C straight-lined):

Loan C (expensed)
$7618.10
Loan A
$7434.06
Loan C (straight-line)
$7400.45
Loan C with a straight-line point deduction always costs the consumer
more than Loan A, irrespective of the time of repayment.2 ° Loan C with
expensing costs the consumer more than Loan A for early prepayment
This is true even though the remainder of the points not yet deducted can be
deducted upon prepayment. The proof of this proposition is as follows. Consider two
rules: (1) straight-line and (2) "economically-correct." Under the economically-cor20
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but less for late prepayment. In effect, a consumer who chooses Loan C
and who can expense the points trades off a tax benefit against a prepayment penalty. The net gain of choosing Loan C instead of Loan A depends on when the loan is prepaid. Table 11 compares the tax advantage
(in present value) to the prepayment penalty for various prepayment
dates.
If the consumer holds the loan to maturity, the consumer will have
gained from the tax benefit without suffering any loss. The break-even

point comes late in this loan, because in order for the tax benefit to outweigh the prepayment penalty, the prepayment penalty must fall below
30% of the points, given a tax rate of 30%. This condition holds because
the present value of the tax advantage will never exceed 30% of the

rect method, the IRS would make the interest deduction each period the same as with
Loan A. Mathematically,
(i)

X0 = lAi - 1Ci

where Xc is the point deduction for Loan C in period i, 1 Aj is the interest deduction
for loan A in period i, and lci is the interest deduction for Loan C in period i. The
straight-line method costs the borrower more than the economically-correct method
irrespective of whether the loan is prepaid, since both result in the same overall deduction but the straight-line method gives that deduction in later periods.
Absent prepayment, the economically-correct method costs the borrower the same
as Loan A. With prepayment, however, the economically-correct method costs the
borrower more. We can see this as follows. Compare Loan A to Loan C with the
economically-correct method of deducting points. Both loans have the same payments:
lC + PC = IAi + PAi
(ii)
PA is the principal paid in period i for loan A and Pci is the principal paid in period i
for loan C. Based on equations (i) and (ii):
PQ = X0 + PAi
(iii)
Now suppose that prepayment occurs just after making the jth payment. For loan
C, the borrower can take an additional tax deduction for the points that would have
been deducted for periods j+1 on. This additional tax deduction can be written as:
Deduction =

n
I

(iv)

X.

i=j+l
On the other hand, the borrower must pay an implicit prepayment penalty that is
the difference between the amount owed on Loan C and that owed on Loan A:
n

n

Implicit Prepayment Penalty = I Pa, - I P.,
(v)
i=j+l
i=j+l
By substituting equation (iii) into equation (v), we see that the additional tax deduction equals the implicit prepayment penalty. Thus, if the tax rate is less than one,
the prepayment penalty exceeds the tax benefit. Since Loan C with the economicallycorrect method costs the borrower more than Loan A, and since Loan C with the
straight-line method costs the borrower more than with the economically-correct
method, it follows that the straight-line method must cost the borrower more than
Loan A for any or no prepayment.

POINTS AND PENALTIES

19971

TABLE 11

When Prepaid
Immediate
After 1 Year
After 2 Years
After 3 Years
After 4 Years
No Prepayment
points.

Tax Advantage of Loan
C, with expensing
(relative to Loan A)

Prepayment Penalty
(present value)

Net Gain

900.00
659.62
468.36
325.69
231.09
184.04

3000.00
1926.00
1113.37
536.60
172.49
0.00

-2100.00
-1266.38
--645.01
-210.91
58.06
184.04

This takes some time.

Consider again our thirty-year mortgage with 4 points and an interest
rate of 7.5%. Table 12 lists the tax advantage and prepayment penalty
relative to the reference mortgage loan:
TABLE 12

When Prepaid

Tax Advantage of
Expensing Points (relative
to no-points loan) (PV)

Prepayment
Penalty (PV)

Immediately
After 1 Year
After 2 Years
After 3 Years
After 4 Years
After 5 Years
After 10 Years
After 15 Years
After 20 Years
After 25 Years
Not Prepaid

1200.00
1169.13
1139.36
1110.70
1083.13
1056.67
940.60
851.21
787.97
750.32
737.75

4000.00
3597.05
3228.26
2891.00
2582.88
2301.70
1232.64
585.97
222.44
48.17
0.00

Net
Advantage
(PV)
-2800.00
-2427.92
-2088.90
-1780.30
-1499.75
-1245.03
-292.04
265.24
565.53
702.16
737.75

In this loan, the tax advantage exceeds the prepayment penalty only if
the borrower prepays the loan after the twelfth year. If the consumer
cannot expense and must deduct on a straight-line basis, then Loan C
costs the consumer more at every prepayment date (even if the loan is
held to maturity) compared to an equivalent points-free mortgage.
CONCLUSIONS

We have used economic analysis in this essay primarily as a descriptive
tool in order to reveal the salient features of the regulation of points and
penalties. We have demonstrated that a mortgage with points can oper21 This holds as a necessary condition. Generally, the prepayment penalty must
fall much below this, since even with a thirty-year loan, expensing does not yield a tax
advantage equal to 30% of the points after the initial time period.
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ate in a manner identical to a mortgage with a prepayment penalty. Thus,
in every mortgage with points, there exists an implicit and easily calculable prepayment penalty. We have made no arguments about the wisdom
of permitting such prepayment penalties. Although some states and federal agencies prohibit explicit prepayment penalties as an important policy goal, the use of points circumvents this goal. In addition, even if state
and federal legislation permits prepayment penalties, we believe that legislation should require lenders to disclose prepayment penalties where
they truly, and economically, exist.

